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Public Service Obligations and the State Aid 
Control 
(The Altmark-criteria in practice in the European Union Courts) 
The Communication from the Commission in 2012* established: "Services of General 
economic interest (SGEIs) not only routed in the shared values of the Union but also 
play central role in promoting social and territorial cohesion." In other respects, 
however, - as Cruz states - "SGEIs are complicated entities. There are at once 
economic and social, private and public."2 
The SGEIs encompass important fields of the Member States' market economy. 
Reghini notes that in 2007 public services gave more than one fourth of the EU-27 GDP 
and that more than 30% of the total workforce was employed in this sector.3 We 
mention a few fields under the sector relevant regulations such as: the transport industry 
(in 2007 it accounted for 4.6% of GDP in the EU-27)4, the energy sector (around 7% of 
EU-27 GDP)5, Waste and Water Services (equivalent to 2.5% of the EU's GDP)6, Postal 
Services (0.7% of EU-27 GDP), Financial Services (accounted for 5.7% of EU-27), 
Public Service Broadcasting (accounted for 5% of European GDP), Health Care (which 
represented from 6 to 10% of EU countries' GDP depending on each Member State). 
The importance of these fields is clearly shown by the fact that between the period of 
September 2008 and the end of 2010 more than 10% of EU Member States' GDP was 
spent on redressing the stability of financial institutions in difficulties and re-
establishing the normal functioning of financial markets.7 
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7 Commission Staff Working Paper (Oct 2011) on "The effects of temporary state aid rules adopted in the 
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The SGEIs (besides their importance) are also the centre of attention, because the 
effective and reliable functioning of these public services affects the broad sphere of 
citizens. In this respect, their activities are politically sensitive. Member States protect 
their related (and remaining) competencies very carefully. 
As Advocate General Poiares Maduro emphasises in the definition of whether an 
activity exhorted by the State or by a public entity was of economic nature "The Court 
is entering dangerous territory, since it must find a balance between the need to protect 
undistorted competition on the common market and respect for the powers of the 
Member States. (. . .) The power of the State which is exercised in the political sphere is 
subject to democratic control. A different type of control is imposed on economic 
operators acting on a market: their conduct is governed by competition law. But there is 
no justification, when the State is acting as an economic operator, for relieving its 
actions of all control. On the contrary, it must observe the same rules in such cases. It is 
therefore essential to establish a clear criterion for determining the point at which 
competition law becomes applicable. In principle, the rules of competition law apply 
only to economic operators who participate on a market and not to States, save where 
they pay aid to undertakings (Articles 88 EC to 92 EC). However, the need for 
consistency means that if a State ratifies decisions taken by undertakings or if it 
conducts itself in practice as an economic operator, Articles 81 EC to 86 EC may apply 
to it. It should be added that Article 86(2) EC would be rendered redundant if 
competition law were no longer to apply as soon as the State is present on a market."8 
In this sensitive field, it seemed particularly important to clarify under what 
conditions individual Member States can take part in the financing of general public 
sectors so that it would be not qualified as State aid. The answer is found in the 
judgement of Altmark case on 24. 7.2003. In this judgement, the Court ruled that: 
'Where a State measure must be regarded as compensation for the services provided 
by the recipient undertakings in order to discharge public service obligations, so that 
those undertakings do not enjoy a real financial advantage and the measure thus does 
not have the effect of putting them in a more favourable competitive position than the 
undertakings competing with them, such a measure is not caught by Article (107(1) of 
the Treaty). However, for such compensation to escape qualification as State aid in a 
particular case, a number of conditions must be satisfied. 
- ( . . . ) First, the recipient undertaking must actually have public service obligations 
to discharge, and the obligations must be clearly defined. (. . .) 
- (. . .) Second, the parameters on the basis of which the compensation is calculated 
must be established in advance in an objective and transparent manner, to avoid it 
conferring an economic advantage which may favour the recipient undertaking over 
competing undertakings. (. . .) Payment by a Member State of compensation for the loss 
incurred by an undertaking without the parameters of such compensation having been 
guarantee and recapitalisation schemes in the financial sector in the current crises" 7 August 2009 2nd 
appendix presumes that EU public intervention in the banking sector is 12.6%. 
8 Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro delivered on 10 November 2005, Case C-205/03P. FENIN, 
p. 26. 
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established beforehand, where it turns out after the event that the operation of certain 
services in connection with the discharge of public service obligations was not 
economically viable, therefore constitutes a financial measure which falls within the 
concept of State aid within the meaning of Article (107(1) of the Treaty). 
- (...) Third, the compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or part 
of the costs incurred in the discharge of public service obligations, taking into account 
the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit (...) 
- (...) Fourth, where the undertaking which is to discharge public service 
obligations, in a specific case, is not chosen pursuant to a public procurement procedure 
which would allow for the selection of the tenderer capable of providing those services 
at the least cost to the community, the level of compensation needed must be 
determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs which a typical undertaking, well run 
and adequately provided with means of transport so as to be able to meet the necessary 
public service requirements, would have incurred in discharging those obligations, 
taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging the 
obligations'9. 
Most analysts considered this judgement to be a "Landmark decision"10 and in 
general it was positively welcomed in academic writings. 10 years have passed since its 
pronouncement. It is worth examining what kind of difficulties have arisen in its 
application within EU Courts and what further questions need to be clarified. 
I. Preliminary questions 
a) The "retroactive" use of the Altmark-criteria 
In more than one case the question arose" of whether it is possible to use the 
Altmark criteria in cases in which the Commission has already ruled its contested 
decision prior to the Altmark ruling. In response to this question, the BUPA judgement 
gave the following answer: "the interpretation which the Court of Justice gives of a 
provision of Community law (...) is limited to clarifying and defining the meaning and 
scope of that provision as it ought to have been understood and applied from the time of 
its entry into force. It follows that the provision as thus interpreted may, and must, be 
applied even to legal relationships which arose and were established before the 
judgement in question and it is only exceptionally that, in application of a general 
principle of legal certainty which is inherent in the Community legal order, the Court 
may decide to restrict the right to rely upon a provision, which it has interpreted, with a 
view to calling in question legal relationships established in good faith."12 
9 C-280/00 Altmark Trans GmbH et Regierungsprasidium Magdeburg v Nachtverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark 
GmbH, [2003] 87-93. 
10 As an example: BUENDIA SIERRA, J. L.-MUNOZ DE JUAN, M. : Some Legal Reflexions on the Almunia 
Package. In: EStAL 2/2012.p. 64. 
" For example in the judgements of the CFI, T-289/03 BUPA ea./Commission [2008], or in the T-388/03 
Deutsche Post et DHL International/Commission [2009], 
12 T-289/03 BUPA ea. v. Commission [2008] 159. 
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b) Services regarded as SGEI 
Court practice already clarified prior to the Altmark decision that: "SGEIs are 
services that exhibit special characteristics as compared with those of other economic 
activities."13 The Olsen judgement14 (arguments between parties) quotes the 
"Communication from the Commission on services of general interest in Europe" which 
says: "services of general interest are different from ordinary services in that public 
authorities consider that they need to be provided even where the market may not have 
sufficient incentives to do so. (...)However, if the public authorities consider that 
certain services are in the general interest and market forces may not result in a 
satisfactory provision, they can lay down a number of specific service provisions to 
meet these needs in the form of service of general interest obligations." 15 
In connection with this, point 46 of the Communication from the Commission 2012 
quotes the statement from the BUPA judgement according to which: "In the absence of 
specific Union rules defining the scope for the existence of an SGEI, Member States 
have a wide margin of discretion in defining a given service as an SGEI and in granting 
compensation to the service provider. The Commission's competence in this respect is 
limited to checking whether the Member State has made a manifest error when defining 
the service as an SGEI."16 
If there is a debate whether certain services should have been qualified by their 
characteristic of general economics, competitors (or potential competitors) must prove 
their ability to deal with the task without rival political power. In the Olsen case the CFI 
established that in cases when the provider entrusted with SGEI tasks rendered its 
services in competition with other market players - in that particular case the applicant 
- competitors must prove that they would have been able to ensure similar services in 
terms of continuity, regularity and frequency on all the routes served by the company 
under the provisional arrangements.17 
In other cases, when the task can be carried out by companies working under normal 
market conditions it is not justified to organize the work in the frame of SGEI. As laid 
down in the Communication from the Commission in 2012: "As for the question of 
whether a service can be provided by the market, the Commission's assessment is 
limited to checking whether the Member State has made a manifest error." In 
connection with this, point 49 of the Communication mentions the example of the 
broadband sector, for which the Commission has already made clear decisions that in 
areas where private investors have already invested in broadband network infrastructure 
and are already providing competitive structure, setting up parallel broadband 
infrastructure should not be considered as an SGEI. 
Moreover, the BUPA judgement shows that the Member State's power to take action 
and its power to define SGEIs is not unlimited and cannot be exercised arbitrarily for 
13 See for example C-179/90 Merci Convenzionali Porto di Genova [1991] 27, C-266/96 Corsica Ferries 
France SA [1998] 45. 
14 T-17/02 Olsen/Commission [2005], 205. 
15 OJ 2001 C17 4 ,p 14. 
16 BUPA judgement (n 12, above) 166-169, 172. 
17 Olsen judgement (n 14, above) 219. 
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the sole purpose of removing a particular sector from the application of the competi-
tion.18 
Numerous questions aros in particular, for example, certain recognition as SGEI 
mission in the health sector. The BUPA judgement for instance shows the difference 
between the definition of state controlled market activity and an SGEI mission 
controlled by the relevant authorities. SGEI missions should by definition serve the 
general or public interest. In addition, the national legislature acting in the general 
interest in the broad sense imposes certain rules of authorisation, of functioning or of 
control over all the operators in a particular sector does not in principle mean that there 
is an SGEI mission. The recognition of an SGEI mission could impose an obligation on 
the same market on a large number of, or indeed on all, active market players.19 
The CBI judgement, however, points out that: "although the conditions stated in the 
Altmark judgement (...) and in the SGEI package concern all sectors of the economy 
without distinction, their application must take into account the specific nature of the 
sector in question."20 It is necessary to show flexibility with regard to the particular 
character of certain fields in which SGEI missions are treated. In the hospital sector the 
lack of general and commercial dimension must also be taken into consideration. The 
criteria laid down by the Court of Justice in the Altmark judgement concerning 
transport, which is unquestionably an economic and competitive activity, cannot be 
applied as strictly to the hospital sectors.21 Moreover it points out that: "Article 86(2) 
EC in the hospital sector concerned must take account of respect for the responsibilities 
of the Member States for the definition of their health policy and the organisation and 
delivery of health services and medical care. That consideration stems, inter alia, from 
Article 152 (5) EC."22 
II. Clearly defined public service obligations 
According to the Altmark judgement's first criterion, the company that receives 
compensation must be entrusted with obligations of general interests and these 
engagements must be clearly defined. The CBI judgement quotes under Article 4 of 
Decision 2005/842: "responsibility for operation of the [SGEI] shall be entrusted to the 
undertaking concerned by way of one or more official acts, the form of which may be 
determined by each Member State", such acts to specify, in particular 'the nature and 
the duration of the public service obligations' and 'the undertaking and territory 
concerned'."23 The public service missions may be defined with legislative and 
regulatory acts, but the mandate may also encompass contractual acts, provided that 
they emanate from the public authority and are binding.24 It also notes that: "in that 
18 BUPA judgement (n 12, above) 168. 
" BUPA judgement (n 12, above) 178-179. 
20 T-137/10 Coordination bruxelloise d'institutions sociales et de santé (CBI)/Commission [2012] 85. 
21 CBI judgements 20, above) 88-89. 
22 CBI judgement (n 20, above) 92. 
23 CBI judgement (n 20, above) 102. 
24 CBI judgement (n 20, above) 105-109. 
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regard, ( . . .) a body may be regarded as endowed with the exercise of public power if it 
is composed of a majority of representatives of the public authority and if, when 
adopting a decision, it must satisfy a certain number of criteria of general interest."25 
The Olsen judgement also states that: "it is not apparent either from the wording of 
Article 86(2) EC or from the case-law on that provision that a general interest task may 
be entrusted to an operator only as a result of a tendering procedure."26 Here it must be 
mentioned that according to the Olsen judgement "a public service task may be 
entrusted to an operator [if the operator so requests,] through the grant of a public 
service concession".27 The clear definition of public service obligation is never the 
object of questions, even if the provider changes its schedule of services and the table of 
rates prior to the approval from the competent authorities.28 
III. Parameters of compensation 
According to the second criterion in the Altmark judgement, the parameters on the basis 
of which the compensation is calculated must be established in advance in an objective 
and transparent manner, to avoid it conferring an economic advantage which may 
favour the recipient undertaking over competing undertakings.29 
The Member State has wide discretion not only when defining an SGEI mission but 
also when determining the compensation for the costs connected with the SGEIs.30 The 
BUPA judgement, however, states that these "transparent parameters must be defined in 
such a way as to preclude any abusive recourse to the concept of an SGEI on the part of 
the Member State".31 In the TV2 Denmark cases the Court of First Instance noted that: 
"the second Altmark condition leaves Member States free to choose how to comply 
with it in practical terms, if the determination of the amount of licence fee was objective 
and transparent"32 It adds, however, that: "The Commission's actual legal and economic 
considerations on which governed the setting of the amount of licence fee income 
payable must be based on these respects."33 
In certain cases the Commission doesn't have the required data that would allow the 
objective and transparent calculation of the basic parameters of the contributions, with 
the result that the Commission's decision must be annulled. This happened in the 
Deutsche Post AG case,34 in which the CFI judged that the Commission did not carry 
out an examination of the cost of the services of general interest provided by La Poste 
compared with the costs which a typical undertaking would have borne and to prove 
25 CBI judgement (n 20, above) 111. 
26 Olsen judgement (n 14, above) 239. 
27 Olsen judgement (n 14, above) 188. 
28 Olsen judgement (n 14, above) 202. 
29 CBI judgement (n 20, above) 189. 
30 CBI judgement (n 20, above) 91. 
31 BUPA judgement s 12, above) 214. 
32 T-309/04., T-317/04., T-329/04, and T-336/04 TV2/Denmark ea. v. Commission joint cases judgement 
227-228. 
33 TV2/Denmark judgement (n 32, above) 230. 
34 T-388/03 Deutsche Post and DHL International v. Commission [2009] 116 and following. 
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what kind of benefits may have occurred from the free disposal of real assets that were 
reserved for pension payments. In this case, to ensure the security of the pension rights 
interest of La Poste workers employed as public officials, La Poste in 1992, after its 
transformation into an autonomous public undertaking, had a reserve of EUR 100 
million, which was withdrawn in 1997. As counter-compensation, the State provided La 
Poste with real assets free of charge. The Commission should have asked the Belgian 
State for clarification concerning the worth of these real assets. Without this data it is 
possible that La Poste would have been given significant increase of capital without 
cause. On appeal the Court of Justice upheld that decision.35 
On the other hand, it accepted the transparent and objective characters of the so-
called risk equalisation scheme created by the Irish authorities and mentioned by the 
CFI in the BUPA case. It lays down the frequency of data communication that private 
insurance companies must provide about their risk profile and the corresponding costs 
according to age groups and gender of the persons insured. In the light of that 
information, the Health Insurance Authority (HIA) makes a comparative assessment on 
what method of calculations and mathematical formulae is needed to calculate the 
method of adjustment. The CFI stated that the complexity of the economic and 
mathematical formulae which govern the calculations to be carried out does not in itself 
affect the precise and clearly-determined nature of the relevant parameters.36 
IV. Amount of compensation and control of overcompensation 
According to the third Altmark criterion, the compensation given cannot be higher than 
the measure needed to cover the whole or partial public service obligation costs, bearing 
in mind the income and reasonable gains of the fulfilment of that commitment. 
The jurisprudence following the Altmark judgement emphasises first and foremost 
that, in connection with this series of questions, the Commission's scope and the 
following court revision is necessarily limited. As regards the scope of control of 
"Member States in defining an SGEI mission and the conditions of its implementation, 
including the assessment of the additional costs incurred in discharging the mission, 
which depends on complex economic facts, the scope of the control which the 
Commission is entitled to exercise in that regard is limited to one of manifest error".37 
The Commission must carefully evaluate all the information available at the moment of 
decision in the given case regarding the size of SGEIs and it must make a precise 
calculation in order to evaluate the direct proportion of the required counter value. 
In the Valmont case38 for example, the Commission examined whether the local 
municipality signed an agreement for the sale of some three hectares of undeveloped 
land intended for industrial purpose to build a car park, below its commercial value, to 
the company Valmont, and whether these parking lots could be used by third parties, or 
35 C-148/09-P Kingdom of Belgium (applicant) v. Deutsche Post AG and DHL Int., (applicants at first 
instance) and the European Commission (defendant at first instance). 
36 BUPA judgement (n 12, above) 216-217. 
37 BUPA judgement (n 12, above) 220-221. 
38 T-274/01 Valmont v. Commission [2004], 
106 OTTO CZLJCZ 
companies and under what conditions. The CFI established that if, with regard to the 
company which bears a burden in the public interest,39 in order to discharge public 
service obligations, the use of land which it owns, so that those undertakings do not 
enjoy a real financial benefit, then the measure does not have the effect of putting them 
in a more favourable competitive position than the undertakings competing with them. 
Since the Commission did not take this into consideration, it couldn't prove that that the 
construction of the car park contained an element of State aid.40 
The Commission cannot simply estimate the amount of compensation, being aware 
of the actual amount of the net proceeds of disposal at the time of the adoption of the 
decision.41 In such cases "it cannot be accepted that the Commission is entitled to rely 
on mere forecasts, even though they do not reflect the true position, so as not to delay 
the adoption of its decision."42 Therefore the CFI stated that the contested decision is 
vitiated by a manifest error and it annulled the decision.43 In the Deutsche Post AG 
case44 the General Court stated that the net additional costs associated with the 
provision of an SGEI obligation must be counted and they must be compared with the 
resources transferred in respect of compensation for those same obligations of 
calculation. "It is only in the light of the result of that comparison that the existence of 
possible overcompensation can be established." If the Commission failed to examine 
(. . .) that (. . .) the total amount of the transfer payment exceeds (. . .) the amount of 
overcompensation, the Commission is using a defective method and the decision must 
be annulled.45 It requires careful consideration whether a company or system entitled to 
an SGEI mission gets overcompensation on the ground that their service is secured by 
another already existing infrastructure. In the Iliad judgement the General Court stated 
that in these cases the plaintiff must bear the burden of proof.46 
Provisions designed to avoid overcompensation often demand the use of 
complicated control and calculating methods, for instance during the examination of 
risk clearing procedures of private health insurance systems47, or in the CBI case. In the 
latter, the General Court stated that within the mechanism for financing hospital 
missions, the law on general disposition of hospitals that defines the methods of 
avoiding non-refunded costs is not sufficient; the same norms should exist for the 
definition of the Brussels regional subventions used to refinance municipalities.48 
According to the General Court, "in particular, where different requirements are 
imposed on the public and private bodies entrusted with the same public service, which 
presupposes a different level of costs and compensation, those differences, must be 
39 Valmont judgement (n 38, above) 124. 
40 Valmont judgement (n 38, above) 129, 133, 137-138. 
41 T-349/03 Corsica Ferries France v. Commission [2005] judgement. 275. 
42 Corsica Ferries judgement (n 41, above) 292. 
43 Corsica Ferries judgement (n 41, above) 300. 
44 C-399/08P Commission v. Deutsche Post judgement [2010] 37. 
45 Deutsche Post judgement (n 44, above) 46-48. 
46 T-325/10 Iliad ea. v. Commission [2013] 224, 228-231. 
47 See BUPA judgement (n 12, above) 220-244. 
48 CBI judgement (n 20, above) 253-257. 
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clearly shown in their respective mandates."49 Similar problems may occur with the 
methods preventing overcompensation in the financing of social services.50 
V. Selection of the SGEI provider 
We distinguish two sub-cases in the fourth Altmark criterion: a) the provider is chosen 
through a public procurement procedure, or b) the level of compensation determined is 
based on an analysis of the costs of an average "well-run" undertaking which is 
adequately provided with the necessary means. 
a) Amount of compensation where the SGEI is assigned under an appropriate 
tendering procedure 
One possible method to fulfil the fourth Altmark criterion is if the authorities 
indicating public functions use an open, transparent and discrimination-free public 
procurement procedure to choose the company they want to entrust with this task. The 
Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council contains51 the 
public procurement procedure in the fields of water, energy, transport and postal 
services sectors. A separate Directive exists for public works contracts, public supply 
contracts and public service contracts.52 In these fields public procurement procedures 
are compulsory for most cases. Authorities charged with the fulfilment of public 
procurement procedures can use this solution even if there isn't an EU regulation. 
The Olsen judgement - as mentioned earlier - also states that: "it is apparent either 
from the wording of Article 86(2) EC or from the case-law on that provision that a 
general interest task may be entrusted to an operator only as a result of a tendering 
procedure."53 In these circumstances the Commission cannot be asked to account for the 
lack of proceeding separately in the contested decision. 
In the Iliad judgement the General Court found a multi-step public procurement 
procedure acceptable.54 In the first step, local authorities conducted an initial study on a 
given field with the help of service providers, of the possibility to cover a given area 
with broadband network, what the characteristic of this service would be, the project's 
estimated costs and the possible method of public co-financing. On the basis of these 
studies, the department already fixed the total amount of subvention at the beginning of 
the procedure. In the second step, the local authorities called for tenders and in the 
consultation phase specified for the six candidates the different parameters of the 
49 CBI judgement (n 20, above) 95. 
50 CBI judgement (n 20, above) 277. 
51 Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 coordinating the 
procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sector OJ L 
134 2004.04.30 pp. 1-114. 
52 Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 coordinating the 
procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sector OJ L 
134 2004.04.30 pp. 114-240. 
53 Olsen judgement (n 14, above) 239. 
54 T-325/10 Iliad ea. v. Commission judgement [2013] 244. 
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planned investment, the future tender's public service obligations and the selection 
criteria. The authorities then compared the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the 
candidates' offers and finally chose the company that won the assignment (paying 
attention to which tender requested the lowest subvention).55 
The Communication from the Commission 201256 states that: "an open procedure in 
line with the requirement of the public procurement rules is certainly acceptable, but 
also a restricted procedure can satisfy the fourth Altmark criterion, unless interested 
operators are prevented to tender without valid reasons". It states that: "a competitive 
dialogue or a negotiated procedure with prior publication confer a wide discretion upon 
the adjudicating authority and may restrict the participation of interested operators. 
Therefore, they can only be deemed sufficient to satisfy the fourth Altmark criterion in 
exceptional cases". According to the Communication, however, an open procedure 
without prior publication does not satisfy the fourth Altmark criterion. 
As to the award criteria, the 'lowest price' obviously satisfies the fourth Altmark 
criterion and as the Communication states the 'most economically advantageous tender' 
is also deemed sufficient.57 In the Iliad judgement the General Court stated that the 
tender winner made the lowest bid and the applicants didn't provide any arguments that 
would have proved that the tender winner had the economically most advantageous 
offer. Therefore judgement in this case could be pronounced even without the further 
questioning of the General Court whether the lowest rate or the economically most 
advantageous proposal better corresponds to thé fourth Altmark criterion's "at the least 
cost to the community" part.58 
b) Amount of compensation if the SGEI is not assigned under tendering procedure 
In cases, when a company's SGEI task assignment does not occur within the public 
procurement procedure, the level of compensation must be defined on the basis of an 
analysis of the costs which a typical well-run undertaking adequately provided with the 
necessary means to be able to meet the necessary public service requirements, would 
have incurred in discharging those obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts 
and a reasonable profit.59 
If in a certain case there was not such detailed analysis, the Commission cannot state 
- as in the TV2 Denmark case - that the Kingdom of Denmark did not respect the fourth 
Altmark criterion.60 The CFI also had a similar point of view in the Deutsche Post AG 
case. It stated that the Commission did not carry out an examination which enabled it to 
determine whether the level of compensation paid to La Poste was fixed on the basis of 
an analysis of the costs which a typical well-run undertaking, adequately provided with 
the necessary means to be able to meet the necessary public service requirements, 
55 Iliad judgement (n 54, above), 244. 
56 The Communication from the Commission 2012/C 8/02 p. 66. 
57 Communication from the Commission on the application of the European Union State aid rules to 
compensation granted for the provision of services on general economic interest 2012/C 8/02 p 67. 
58 Iliad judgement (n 54, above) 252. 
59 Exception, if the given service has a commonly accepted market rate. See Communication from the 
Commission 2012 69p. and under the same point mentioned Commission Decision. 
60 TV2/Denmark 231-234. 
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would have incurred in discharging those obligations, taking into account the relevant 
receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging the obligations. The Commission did not 
carry out an examination of the cost of the services of general interest provided by La 
Poste compared with the costs which a typical undertaking would have borne, an 
appraisal which might have enabled it to find that the measures examined did not 
constitute State aid.61 
In the BUPA judgement the CFI stated that: "the fourth Altmark condition, in that it 
requires a comparison of the costs and receipts directly linked to the supply of the 
SGEI, cannot be strictly applied to the present case."62 From the point of view of the 
Commission, the risk equalisation scheme (RES) is not intended to compensate for an 
identified cost occasioned by the supply of a private medical insurance (PMI) service. 
The RES payments reflect the risk profile differentials of those two insurers by 
comparison with the average market risk profile. With regard to the neutrality of the 
compensation system constituted by the RES by referring to the receipts and profits of 
the PMI insurers and to the particular nature of the additional costs linked with a 
negative risk profile on the part of those insurers, the Commission was entitled in this 
case to consider the existence of State aid, there was no need to draw a comparison 
between the potential recipients of the RES payments and an efficient operator.63 
Finally, the CFI stated that the Commission - in the light of the purpose of the fourth 
Altmark condition - was none the less required to satisfy itself that the compensation 
provided for by the RES did not entail the possibility of offsetting any costs that might 
result from inefficiency on the part of the PMI insurers subject to the RES. In that 
regard, the Court considered it sufficient that the Commission expressly found in the 
contested decision that the RES took into account the PMI insurers' own average claim 
cost, thus avoiding an equalisation of their average costs per cell of insured population 
and allowing the insurers to keep the benefit of their own performance.64 
Conclusions 
Since the Altmark judgement's introduction the European Court of Justice and the 
General Court have used the Altmark criteria in about 20-25 cases.65 The cases analysed 
clearly show that the criteria provide an excellent basis in the judgement of similar 
cases. The first three criteria in particular could be applied with the usual judicial 
interpretation techniques without greater difficulties.66 
61 T-388/03 Deutsche Post and DHL International v Commission [2009] 114-116. 
62 BUPA judgement (n 12, above) 246. 
63 BUPA judgement (n 12, above) 246-248. 
64 BUPA judgement (n 12, above) 249. 
65 In this study cases that only mentioned the Altmark criteria in a formal way without the criteria being 
significantly used in the final judgement were not mentioned. 
66 KLASSE, M. came to similar conclusions analysing the decision-making process of the Commission in the 
study entitled: "The Impact of Altmark: The European Commission Case Law Reponses". In: SZYSZCZAK, 
E. - GRONDEN, J. W. (eds.): Financing Services of General Economic Interest. TMC Asser Press, The 
Hague, The Netherlands, 2013. p 50. 
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The application of the fourth Altmark criterion is somewhat different. The BUPA 
case in particular shows, that in situations where State intervention concerns the whole 
of an economic sector (e.g. private medical insurance), where neither the possibility for 
tender nor of well-organised competing companies' benchmark is available in the 
estimation of compensation costs, alternative solutions must be found. In the BUPA 
judgement the CFI accepted a solution that had the same goal and the same ideal as the 
fourth Altmark criterion, which is to ensure that the SGEI in question is supplied at the 
least cost to the community.67 
Serious complications may occur in practice in the use of the fourth criterion as the 
2011 Commission consultation by the Member State representatives and other 
stakeholders on the applications of the new SGEI package indicates.68 The observation 
demonstrates that a large number of consultation participants would welcome additional 
clarification in relation to a number of key concepts. They have drawn attention to the 
fact, that the application of the "well-run" undertaking benchmark is creates difficulties 
for both the acting authorities and the service providers. They found very complicated 
to choose a company with the right benchmark in certain market segments. 
The participants have identified difficulties arising from the tender branch of the 
fourth Altmark criterion. Most of them mentioned that relevant tender procedure results 
responding to EU provision of law should be established in a such way that it excludes 
the possibility of otherwise forbidden State aid at a later stage. Many of them proposed 
that the standard applied by the Court of Justice ("provision of the service at the least 
cost to the community") should be interpreted as being fully in line with the 
requirements under EU procurement law ("most economically advantageous tender").69 
Despite all the difficulties and criticism, it can be stated that the Altmark criteria 
established in 2003 met all expectations. It made it clear when, under Article 106 (2) 
TFEU, public contributions should not be regarded as State contributions. Therefore, 
the Altmark judgement can rightly be regarded as a "Landmark decision". Furthermore, 
since the Altmark criteria were incorporated70 into the new revised State Aid rules for 
SGEI package71 in 2011, there is high hope that it will remain a beacon of light in 
numerous legal disputes concerning State aid for a long time. 
67 BUPA judgement (n 12, above) 246, 249, 255-257. 
68 The experience of the consultation found in the Commission Staff Working Paper: The application of the 
EU State Aid rules on services of general economic interests 2005 and The Outcome of the Public 
Consultation. (SEC 2011 397 23.03.2011. document)p. 4.3. 
69 201 1 Staff Working Paper p. 4.3.2 
70 Sources for example Merola and Ubaldi study, state that "both the 2005 SGEI package and the 2011 reform 
have derived from the Altmark criteria". MEROLA M. - UBALDI T.: The 2011 Almunia Package and the 
Challenges Ahead: Are the New Rules Flexible Enough to Fit the Wide Variety of SGEI? EStAL 2/2012. 
p. 31. 
71 The new package contains four elements: Communication from the Commission on the application of the 
EU state aide rules to compensation granted for the provision of service of general economic interest (OJ , 
11.01.2012, pp 4-14); Commission regulation EU no 360/2012 of 25 April 2012 On the application of 
Article 107 and 108 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union to the de minimis aid granted 
to undertaking providing service of general economic interest (OJ LI 14 26 pt. 4. 2012, pp 8-13); 
Commission decision of 20.12.2011, (OJ L7, 11. 01.2012, pp 3-10); Communication from the 
Commission, EU framework state aid in the form of public service compensation (2011) (OJ C8, 11. 01. 
2012, pp 15-22). 
